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Summary 
Background: Pseudomonas aeruginosa healthcare outbreaks can be time consuming and 
difficult to investigate. Guidance does not specify which typing technique is most practical to 
base decisions on.  
 
Aim: We explore the usefulness of whole genome sequencing (WGS) in the investigation of a 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa outbreak describing how it compares with pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis (PFGE) and variable number tandem repeat (VNTR) analysis.  
 
Methods: Six patient isolates and six environmental samples from an Intensive Care Unit 
(ICU) positive for P. aeruginosa over two years underwent VNTR, PFGE and WGS.   
 
Findings: VNTR and PFGE were required to fully determine the potential source of infection 
and rule out others. WGS results unambiguously distinguished linked isolates giving greater 
assurance of the transmission route between wash hand basin (WHB) water and two patients 
supporting control measures employed.  
 
Conclusion: WGS provided detailed information without need for further typing. When allied 
to epidemiological information it can be used to understand outbreak situations rapidly and 
with certainty. Implementation of WGS in real-time would be a major advance in day-to-day 
practice. It could become a standard of care as it becomes more widespread due to its 
reproducibility and reduction in costs.   
 
Summary word count 191 
Keywords: Sequencing, Pseudomonas, Resistance, Outbreak, Water 
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Introduction 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is a Gram-negative bacterium that is ubiquitous in moist hospital 
environments [1,2]. It is an opportunistic pathogen in immunocompromised patients causing 
a wide range of infections [2-6]. Hospital water can be a source of outbreaks in neonatal units 
and both adult and paediatric intensive care units colonising and forming biofilms in water 
taps, sinks, toilets, showers and drains [2,7-13].  Routes of transmission include environment-
to-patient either directly from contaminated water or splashes from water outlets, or 
indirectly from contaminated hands or equipment. Transmission from colonised patients to 
the environment and between patients can occur during clinical procedures that create 
aerosols. Infection can be acquired and arise from the patient’s own gut microbiota after 
pseudomonads have been selected out by antibiotics [14]. Multidrug resistance in P. 
aeruginosa species is common, and the mortality rate in invasive infections is up to 29%; 
controlling the spread of this organism is therefore important [15,16]. 
 
Differentiating strains is essential to identify routes of transmission of organisms, to identify 
reservoirs and plot potential chains of transmission. Variable number tandem repeat (VNTR) 
typing, a PCR-based method represents an improvement in speed and reproducibility over 
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) whilst providing a similar level of discrimination 
[1,16].  Turton et al. suggested that isolates similar by VNTR, with no strong epidemiological 
links between them should be confirmed by PFGE [1]. Newer methods of whole genome 
sequencing (WGS) offer the potential to give greater resolution, reproducibility and may be 
faster at identifying strains in an outbreak and deducing the lines of transmission.  WGS has 
been used in the investigation of a variety of bacterial outbreaks, and in some instances for 
the investigation of pseudomonas outbreaks, but to our knowledge we are the first to report 
data comparing the utility of rapid whole genome sequencing (WGS) versus the current 
typing methods VNTR and PFGE [17-27].   
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Materials and Methods 
Four patients were identified as being colonized or infected with a strain of P. aeruginosa 
with an unusual resistance profile in an Intensive Care Unit of a teaching hospital (Ninewells 
Hospital, Dundee) between January 2013 and May 2013. A case finding exercise was carried 
out using the definition ‘a sample positive with P. aeruginosa resistant to imipenem isolated 
from a patient admitted to ICU since 2012’. The case finding exercise yielded a further 5 
patients however, only two patients had isolates that had been stored by the hospital 
laboratory therefore a total 6 patient isolates were available for further testing.  Water (pre- 
and post-flush samples) was sampled from 14 water outlets in ICU for P. aeruginosa on 16th 
May 2013 (Table I).  Monitoring swabs were also taken from 11 water outlet drains on the 
same day (domestic service room wash hand basin [WHB], Bed 7 WHB, Bed 8 WHB, 
kitchen sink, kitchen drinking water tap, domestic service room sink, ventilator room sink, 
ICU entrance WHB, ward area WHB 1, ward area WHB 2, Bed 4 WHB). Caldicott 
Guardian approval was gained in order to protect patient confidentiality and enable 
appropriate information sharing. 
 
Samples and Susceptibility Testing 
All clinical specimens had been collected during routine care and processed at the 
Department of Medical Microbiology Laboratory, Ninewells Hospital, Dundee, UK.  
Environmental samples from each water outlet drain were incubated on MacConkey agar 
aerobically at 37°C and Pseudomonas CN Selective Agar (Oxoid Ltd, United Kingdom) at 
35°C and examined after 24 and 48 hours. Vitek 2 (bioMérieux, Marcy L’Etoile, France) was 
used for organism identification and antibiotic susceptibility testing using minimum 
inhibitory concentrations (MIC) according to the European Committee on Antimicrobial 
Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST). An external contractor sampled all water outlets for P. 
aeruginosa using pre- and post-flush samples. Water samples were processed by a UKAS 
(United Kingdom Accreditation Service) approved laboratory within four hours of collection.  
 
 
 
VNTR and PFGE 
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Environmental and patient isolates were sent to the Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare 
Associated Infections Reference Unit (AMRHAI), Public Health England, Colindale for 
typing (VNTR typing at nine loci and PFGE) as described previously [1]. 
 
WGS and Phylogenetic Analysis 
Isolates were stored on beads at -80ºC until processed.  The cultures were re-cultured by the 
Infection Group, School of Medicine, University of St Andrews.  DNA was then extracted 
using QIAamp DNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany). The quality of the DNA was 
measured as A280 nm/A260 nm ratio on NanoVue (GE Healthcare) and the concentration of 
double stranded DNA assessed using dsDNA BR Kit on a Qubit 2.0 fluorometer (Thermo 
Fisher Scientific).  Amounts of 1 ng of DNA were used for constructing the libraries with 
Nextera® XT kit (Illumina Inc, San Diego, CA, USA). The normalized libraries were 
sequenced using a 2×250 pair-end read of a 500-cycle v2 kit on a MiSeq platform (Illumina 
Inc, San Diego, CA, USA) using a resequencing workflow. The Illumina sequences generated 
were deposited in the European Nucleotide Archive under the study accession number 
ERP023446. Using SMALT (Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute; 
www.sanger.ac.uk/resources/software/smalt/, reads were initially mapped to the chromosome 
of P. aeruginosa PAO1 (accession number AE004091) and single nucleotide polymorphisms 
(SNPs) were identified as previously described [28]. In addition, the chromosomes of a 
representative selection of P. aeruginosa strains: B136-33 (accession number CP004061), 
DK2 (CP003149), LES431 (CP006937), LESB58 (FM209186), M18 (CP002496), MTB-1 
(CP006853), NCGM2.S1 (AP012280), PA1 (CP004054), PA38182 (HG530068), RP73 
(CP006245), SCV20265 (CP006931), UCBPP-PA14 (CP000438), VRFPA04 (CP008739), 
and YL84 (CP007147), were used to provide a wider context for the hospital isolates. For 
each of these additional P. aeruginosa strains, artificial 250bp pair-end reads fastq files were 
generated using a python script. The generated fastq files were mapped along with the 
outbreak isolates to the chromosome of P. aeruginosa PAO1 and SNPs called. 
Recombination was detected in the genomes using Gubbins (http://sanger-
pathogens.github.io/gubbins/) [29].  
 
The core genome regions of the PAO1 and UCBPP-PA14 chromosome were defined by 
human curation using pairwise Blast comparisons with each other, and other P. aeruginosa 
strains [30]. The Artemis Comparison Tool (ACT) was used to visualize the comparisons 
[31]. SNPs falling inside Mobile Genetic Elements (MGEs regions) were excluded from the 
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core genome, as well as those falling in regions predicted by Gubbins to have occurred by 
recombination. Phylogenetic trees were constructed separately using RAxML v7.0.4 for all 
sites in the core genomes containing SNPs, using a General Time Reversible (GTR model) 
with a gamma correction for among site rate variation. [32,33].  For a higher resolution 
phylogeny, ICU isolates that clustered on a branch with UCBPP-PA14 (CP000438), were 
mapped to this sequence as described above.  
 
 
Results 
Epidemiology   
The ICU ward had been free from outbreaks in 2013. It was an eight-bed unit of a Teaching 
Hospital with approximately 950 acute beds (Ninewells Hospital, Dundee). The infection 
prevention and control team (IPCT) were initially concerned that between January 2013 and 
May 2013 there were four patients colonised/infected with a strain of P. aeruginosa with the 
same resistance profile. All patient isolates were sensitive to gentamicin, ciprofloxacin, 
piperacillin-tazobactam, ceftazidime and resistant to imipenem; most patients had received 
carbapenem treatment at some point during their admission. Patients had a mixture of 
diagnoses on admission. 
 
Fluids such as bed bath water and endotracheal aspirate (ETA) were disposed of in the hand 
wash stations. The IPCT visited the ward and gave advice in line with national guidance for 
the appropriate disposal of these potentially contaminated fluids. Procedures for the 
decontamination of two small pieces of equipment, the ventilator flow sensor and 
temperature probes, were also reviewed. These items were decontaminated by immersion in a 
sink filled with hot soapy water. This method was discontinued and sporicidal wipes utilised 
after ascertaining their suitability with the manufacturer. The decontamination sink in the 
back room was found to have crusting on taps; these taps were replaced. This was the sink 
that probes were decontaminated in. WHBs were supplied by Pillar mixer taps with integral 
thermostats (Supplementary Figure 1). The flow from the tap ran close to the sink drains, 
causing splashing. Taps with flow straighteners were at risk of contamination by biofilm.  To 
become more compliant with NHS building regulations these were removed and sink basins 
were replaced to remove overflow drains. The ice machine was supplied by cold water via a 
flexible hose. This was identified as an area where bacteria could proliferate; the hose was 
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therefore replaced by a WRAS-approved hose.  Localised cleaning of all affected outlets was 
carried out.  An increased flushing regimen was introduced to remove any biofilm that was 
present within the affected outlets. Recommended flushing regimen was twice per day for 2 
minutes at a time. Remediation works were successful as there was no growth of 
pseudomonas on repeat testing of outlets and water following these changes.  
 
Antibiotic Susceptibility Testing 
All isolates were confirmed to be P. aeruginosa and five isolates had an indistinguishable 
antibiotic susecptibility pattern (Patient A abdominal drain fluid, Patient B ETA, Patient D 
ETA, Patient E ETA, and Bed 8 WHB). 
 
Environmental Investigation 
Water (pre- and post-flush samples) was sampled from 14 water outlets in ICU for P. 
aeruginosa (Table I). Four areas were found to be positive: ice machine (pre and post), 
domestic service room WHB (pre and post), bed 7 WHB (pre and post), and bed 8 WHB 
(pre).  The initial results suggested that the pseudomonas contamination was most likely local 
to the outlets as the post samples had yielded much lower growth results and negative results 
compared with the pre flush samples. Monitoring swabs were also taken from 11 water outlet 
drains and three were positive (bed 7 WHB water outlet drain, bed 4 WHB water outlet drain 
and ICU entrance WHB water outlet drain).  
 
VNTR and PFGE Analysis 
VNTR analysis of the isolates from the ICU identified that 6 of the isolates belonged to a 
cluster of related profiles, which included Patients B and D and the four environmental 
isolates from Bed 8 WHB water, Bed 4 WHB water outlet drain, Bed 7 WHB water outlet 
drain and kitchen ice machine water (Table II). All of these isolates had VNTR profiles that 
were similar to the PA14 strain, one of the most abundant clonal complexes in the P. 
aeruginosa population, which can be readily isolated from aquatic sources causing infections 
in humans.34 The close relationship of these isolates in the PA14 cluster suggested that these 
isolates may be part of an outbreak. In contrast the isolates from patients A, C, E and F had 
distinct VNTR profiles, both from one another and the PA14 cluster, and also from the 
remaining environmental samples suggesting that these were unlinked and therefore could be 
ruled out of the outbreak.  
  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 8 
PFGE was used to distinguish the PA14 cluster isolates. Analysis of the banding pattern 
divided the isolates into three distinct subtypes designated NINE04PA-1 (Bed 8 WHB water, 
Patient D ETA, Patient B ETA), NINE04PA-1'  (Bed 4 and 7 WHB water outlet drain) and 
NINE04PA-1” (Kitchen ice machine water). There were clear and definite band differences 
between the ice machine isolate and the patient isolates. 
 
Genome Sequencing and Phylogenetic Reconstruction 
WGS and phylogenetic analysis were performed in order to resolve the fine-scale relationship 
between outbreak isolates and explore epidemiological links between the isolates (Figure 1). 
In order to provide a wider genetic context and a snapshot of diversity within the species, 15 
additional P. aeruginosa genome sequences from EMBL nucleotide database were included 
in the analysis. For this overview of the P. aeruginosa population, the WGS reads of the 
isolates were mapped to chromosome of the reference strain PA01 [25].  In total, 182,476 
SNP sites were identified amongst all analyzed isolates and revealed a diverse population 
structure, throughout which were distributed the ICU isolates. The cluster of isolates 
identified by VNTR as belonging to PA14 clone formed a distinct clade in the phylogenetic 
tree that included the reference isolate UCBPP-PA14, which belonged to PA14 clone. The 
next closest isolates to the PA14 cluster were those belonging to patient C ETA and patient F 
ETA and differed from the cluster by ~49,000 SNPs and ~50,000 SNPs, respectively.  
 
In order to provide greater resolution for the relationship of the PA14 cluster isolates, the 
WGS reads were remapped to the reference chromosome of UCBPP-PA14 [26]. This isolate 
was genetically closer to the outbreak isolates than PAO1, and therefore remapping to this 
isolates chromosome would provide increased genomic coverage and consequently greater 
resolution. Initial phylogenetic analysis of the SNP data mapped to UCBPP-PA14  
differentiated the isolates into two separate clusters and a further outlier that was each 
distinguished by over 1000 SNPs: one cluster containing Patient D ETA, Patient B ETA and 
Bed 8 WHB water, which was distinguished from the second cluster containing Bed 4 WHB 
water outlet drain isolate and Bed 7 WHB water outlet drain isolate by 4515 SNPs, which in 
turn was distinguished from the kitchen ice machine water isolate by 1852 SNPs. Analysis of 
the distribution of SNPs in the chromosome identified regions of high SNP density, indicative 
of this variation arising by homologous recombination. Utilizing Gubbins to detect potential 
regions of recombination identified five regions that distinguished the PA14 clone ICU 
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population. Excluding the SNPs in these regions from the phylogenetic reconstruction 
reduced the apparent genetic diversity of the PA14 group, but still maintained the distinction 
of the two clusters and the outlier. In the Patient D ETA, Patient B ETA and Bed 8 WHB 
water cluster the Patient B ETA and Bed 8 WHB water isolates were indistinguishable, and 
differed from the Patient D ETA isolate by four SNPs. The minimal genetic distance between 
these isolates strongly supports transmission between the Bed 8 WHB water and patients D 
and B and is within the range of SNP distances observed in a study that investigated P. 
aeruginosa transmission in a hospital setting [26]. These patients were not in the ICU 
department at the same time.  An overview of conventional typing and genomic analysis and 
the timeline for the delivery of these results is illustrated in Figure 2.   
 
Discussion 
The IPCT had urgent questions to answer: is there an outbreak, is there a common source, 
who is involved, how did the outbreak arise?  In this study, we were able to evaluate the 
relative utility of typing methods to answer these questions.  As one moves from routine 
methods of antibiogram, through VNTR, PFGE to WGS, the understanding of the nature of 
this outbreak becomes apparent.  There is a progressive winnowing of possibly involved 
patients and infection sources. The antibiogram showed a linkage between the Bed 8 WHB 
water and patients B and D but also included patients A and E.   VNTR correctly identified 
the two patients who were part of the outbreak but also identified several false positive 
environmental links. This left the IPCT considering various routes of transmission for 
instance patient care using ice machine water. PFGE was required for complete clarification.  
The clinical benefit of using WGS in this situation is that it rapidly provides absolute clarity 
in distinguishing the isolates in one step, negating the need for IPCT to spend unnecessary 
time contemplating other scenarios of how the transmission came about without certainty.  In 
this situation, this information was combined with epidemiology.  These patients were not in 
the unit at the same time, suggesting that the water supply had acted as a reservoir and source 
of on-going infection.   
 
Recognised interventions to prevent transmission from water to patients were effective in 
preventing further transmission. These included removal of taps with flow straighteners, 
replacement of sink basins with overflow drains, introduction of increased flushing regimen 
and monitoring of water temperature to become fully compliant with national guidance. The 
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IPCT also reviewed procedures for the decontamination of the ventilator flow sensor and 
temperature probes, in addition to making recommendations for the disposal of potentially 
contaminated fluids to prevent transmission of organisms from patients to sink drains and 
distal ends of taps. ICU staff supported changes to their decontamination practices and 
training on new cleaning protocol for sinks was also given. Following this, areas were 
resampled and it was confirmed that remediation works were successful. 
 
We have shown that WGS is a potent tool to direct effective intervention in outbreak 
situations, in comparison to and providing additional information to that generated by 
molecular typing methods. We found that WGS can provide results within 7 days; however it 
should be noted that current start-up costs for this technology remain high.  For WGS to be 
introduced into routine clinical microbiology laboratories investment in infrastructure 
including bioinformatics and expertise for the interpretation, management and storage of data 
is required. Standard operating procedures, validation of methods and quality control 
measures are in place for VNTR and PFGE testing and will be required for WGS to take 
place in clinical laboratories. Our results are limited by the fact that some isolates were not 
stored and not all were successfully recultured. We processed only one colony from each 
sample and this may limit assessment of the diversity of pseudomonas in patient and 
environment samples.  
 
WGS would be of particular use when there are no obvious epidemiological links between 
the patients enabling IPCTs to have timely results using one method. WGS alone provided 
the necessary resolution to identify the transmission pathway, demonstrating unequivocally 
the spread between single water supply to patients, and eliminating other potential 
transmission events and sources. Thought should be given as to how to make these powerful 
data available routinely in a timely manner, and in a format that is easily interpretable and 
clinically relevant. Establishing tools such as sequencing machines locally can reduce the 
turnaround time.  It is essential that clinicians develop a new approach to investigate hospital 
outbreaks and escalate to WGS at an early stage to allow accurate and rapid description of the 
causes. It is only by using WGS in real-time that it will be used as a powerful tool to improve 
patient outcomes. 
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Figure 1. Phylogenomic analysis of Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolates.  
 
 
 
 
 
Legend 
Maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree built with core SNPs identified by mapping to the 
PAO1 reference genome is presented on the left of the figure. The box on the right contains a 
maximum likelihood phylogeny of the ICU isolates belonging to the PA14 clone, where reads 
were mapped to the PA14 reference genome of UCBPP-PA14R. The tree was built with core 
SNPs, excluding SNPs identified in regions that had arisen by recombination (the number of 
SNPs associated with recombination is given in red text above the branches on which they 
were identified). Scale bars illustrating the relative SNPs distances of the phylogenetic trees 
are displayed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Overview of conventional typing and genomic analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Example photograph of the type of sink that was used on the unit 
at the time 
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Table I. Results of microbiological detection for Pseudomonas aeruginosa in water (pre and post 
flush samples) samples from water outlets in the Intensive Care Unit. 
 
Source Pseudomonas count (cfu/ml) 
pre-flush samples 
Pseudomonas count (cfu/ml) 
post-flush samples 
Ice Machine >100 >100 
Domestic Service Room WHB  37 1 
Bed 7 WHB >100 28 
Bed 8 WHB 41 0 
Kitchen Sink 0 0 
Kitchen Drinking Water Tap 0 0 
Kitchen Hydroboil 0 0 
Domestic Service Room Sink 0 0 
Ventilator Room Sink 0 0 
ICU Entrance WHB  0 0 
Chilled Drinking Water 
Dispenser 
0 0 
Ward Area WHB 1 0 0 
Ward Area WHB 2 0 0 
Bed 4 WHB  0 0 
 
Key: WHB wash hand basin  
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Table II. VNTR profiles of Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolates from the Intensive Care Unit 
Source Date of Sampling VNTR 
Bed 4 WHB Water Outlet Drain 16/05/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,11 
Bed 7 WHB Water Outlet Drain 16/05/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,11 
Bed 8 WHB Water  16/05/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,12 
Domestic Service Room WHB Water 16/05/2013 12,3,6,3,1,4,14,5,10 
ICU Entrance WHB Water Outlet Drain 16/05/2013 12,3,-,3,1,4,14,5,10 
Ice Machine Water 16/05/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,14 
Patient A Abdominal Drain Fluid  11/03/2012 12,6,7,5,3,4,8,1,11 
Patient B ETA 21/09/2012 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,12 
Patient C ETA 04/01/2013 11,2,6, ,3,6,6,6,12 
Patient D ETA 15/04/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,12 
Patient E ETA 11/05/2013 12,4,-,-,3,1,6,4,13 
Patient F ETA 05/05/2013 12,2,-,3,2,2,-,5,6 
Key: WHB wash hand basin  
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Environmental samples
Bed 4: Bed 4 WHB Water Outlet Drain 
Bed 7: Bed 7 WHB Water Outlet Drain
Bed 8: Bed 8 WHB Water
DSR: Domestic Service Room WHB Water
ICU Entrance: ICU Entrance WHB Water 
Outlet Drain
Ice Machine: Water
Patient samples
A: Patient A Abdominal Drain Fluid
B: Patient B ETA 
C: Patient C ETA
D: Patient D ETA
E:  Patient E ETA
F:  Patient F ETA
 Strains deemed “in” by typing
 Strains deemed “out” by typing 
Antibiogram (48 hours) VNTR (2 days)  PFGE (7 days)  WGS (7 days or less)
Bed 8
A
B
D
E
Bed 8
Bed 4
Bed 7
Ice Machine
B
D
Bed 8
B
D
Bed 8
B
D
Bed 4
Bed 7
DSR
ICU Entrance
Ice Machine
F
C
DSR
ICU Entrance
A
C
E
F
Bed 4
Bed 7
Bed 4
Bed 7
Ice Machine Ice Machine
E
A
ICU Entrance
DSR
C
F
